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Abstract
This paper provides empirical evidence that, irrespective of the foreign
exchange rate regime, countries with high monetary volatility have lower
relative output growth rates. It is argued that due to the forward looking
nature of the foreign exchange market, exchange rate stability hinges on
the stability of the institutional structure within which monetary and fiscal
policies are formulated. Subsequently, the likely endogenous response in
the accession countries upon entry into EU and EMU is examined. This
provides arguments for a rapid transition phase, possibly complemented
by a one sided euroisation as a commitment device.
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1 Introduction
To start right away with the main conclusion, we find that the choice of the
foreign exchange rate regime is only of secondary importance for achieving mon-
etary stability and real growth. The empirical evidence is that countries with
high monetary volatility have lower relative output growth rates. The growth
rates, however, appear not to be affected by the amount of forex variability
and the type of forex rate system in place over and above the negative effects
stemming from monetary instability. The fact that real growth is insulated
from forex variability, after taking into account the monetary instability, is
analogous to the well established relative insensitivity of the trade account to
forex uncertainty, see for instance Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000). Within
the monetary theory of exchange rates, this insensitivity can be seen as an im-
plication of the forward looking nature of the forex markets. Since the spot
exchange rate is determined by the discounted sum of all future expected fun-
damentals, forex stability hinges on the stability of the institutional structure
within which monetary and fiscal policies are formulated. Seen in this way, a
flexible forex regime can be very stable, if the current and anticipated mone-
tary and fiscal policies are coherent with the market’s forex rate evaluation, as
countries like The Netherlands and Switzerland have shown. Conversely, as is
illustrated by the lively history of the European Monetary System and other
currency arrangements, a managed float or fixed forex system may be unstable.
We continue with an investigation of the likely endogenous response in
the financial and real sectors in the Central and Eastern European Countries
(CEECs) upon entry in Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). We
show that standard monetary theory predicts that the country-specific finan-
cial risk within the accession countries will reduce significantly upon entry. In
combination with the forward looking nature of the financial markets, this risk
reduction provides a strong argument for a rapid transition. As the cases of
Italy and Portugal showed, the perspective of entry brings forward the benefits
of eliminating the risk premium from the domestic interest rate.
We also investigate the feasibility of low inflation and stable currency criteria
for EMU accession.1 Standard arguments imply that it may be very difficult for
the accession countries to satisfy the low inflation criterion. For instance, the
high-growth entrants will have higher inflation, due to the Balassa-Samuelson
effects. In fact, currently consumer prices and production in Ireland, Spain,
and The Netherlands tend to rise faster than in Germany. Furthermore, due to
1The complete set of EMU accession criteria, or so-called ”Copenhagen Criteria”, are put
down in the Composite Paper, see European Commission (1998).
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the Walters’ effect, high-inflation countries that peg their currencies to the euro
are likely to undergo persistent oscillations in the real interest rate and the real
exchange rate. The latter effect is likely to be especially strong in institutionally
underdeveloped countries, such as the CEECs. The anticipation of a stable path
for the exchange rate in the short run, invites for capital inflows which often
bear a pure speculative character, and may reverse themselves on the smallest
doubt, recall the Asian and Russian financial crises. Taken together, although
EMU entry is advantageous, it may be very difficult for the CEECs to satisfy
the EMU accession criteria.
The paper ends in the way it starts, by subscribing to an unconventional
recipe. In our opinion the transition phase to EMU can be speeded up for
the smaller CEECs by closing the door to the exchange rate mechanism un-
conditionally. Currently several of CEECs are already on a currency board,
for instance Bulgaria, Estland and Lithuania. But, as the history of currency
boards shows, interest rates can still reach delirious levels once the public starts
to doubt the tenability of the board. Think of, for example, the Hong Kong
experience during the Asian crisis, and the present financial crisis in Argentine.
Interest rate hikes are also observed in countries with managed currency pegs.
For instance, during the EMS crisis the Irish interest rates raised dramatically.
Smaller CEECs may opt to cross-out the undesirable interest rate and accession
uncertainty through a full scale euroisation upon receipt of the entry (commit-
ment) from the EU. At the same time such an arrangement would make clear
that the remaining inflationary pressures are entirely due to real factors, such as
the Balassa-Samuelson effect, and cannot be the result of imprudent monetary
policy on the side of accession countries.
2 Choice of Forex Regime and Economic Growth
In this section we analyze the relationships between the choice of the forex
regime, monetary variables, and output. To this end we exploit the mone-
tary theory of the exchange rate empirically and theoretically. Specifically, we
estimate the monetary model of the exchange rate on a panel containing the
accession and EMU countries. From the estimated model, we calibrate the em-
pirical first and second moments of the models’ components country by country.
Subsequently, we present evidence implying that countries with high monetary
volatility have lower relative output growth rates, but that the exchange rate
variability and the type of exchange rate system do not play an additional role
in this relationship. We end this section by showing that the forex regime ir-
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relevance result also follows from the forward solution of the monetary model.
This solution shows that forex stability derives from the institutional structure
within which monetary and fiscal policies are formulated, but for which the
type of forex system is relatively unimportant.
2.1 The Monetary Foreign Exchange Rate Model
As is well known, the monetary model of the forex consists of two building
blocks: the monetarist money demand model and the purchasing power parity
supposition. The standard money demand relation in logarithmic format reads
m− p = τy − λr + ε, (1)
where M = em is money demand, P = ep is the price level, Y = ey is the
output, and r is the nominal interest rate. Other plausible restrictions are a
positive income elasticity τ > 0, and a negative interest semi-elasticity λ > 0.
The residual term ε contains all effects that are not captured by the log-linear
money demand model (1). The relative money demand of a country vis-a-vis
Germany is
m˜− p˜ = τ y˜ − λr˜ + ε˜, (2)
where x˜ ≡ x − xGermany. The relative money demand model (2) is the first
building block of the monetary exchange rate model. When money demand
and supply are balanced, equation (2) describes money market equilibrium.
Then relative prices are determined uniquely conform the relationship
p˜ = βm˜+ λr˜ − τ y˜ − ε˜, (3)
where we generalized the model by introducing the money elasticity coefficient
β = ∂s/∂m˜. The quintessence of the monetarist theory is the neutrality hy-
pothesis β = 1.
The second building block is the purchasing power parity (PPP) assumption.
In absolute form, PPP postulates that goods sell for the same price in two
countries. Formally, let S = es denote the nominal exchange rate (units of local
currency per unit foreign currency), then absolute PPP holds if p˜ = s. The
absolute form may not hold due to permanent wedges κ, like transportation
costs. The relative form of the PPP only maintains that the price changes
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Table 1: Countries in Panel
EMU CEEC WEST REST
Austria* Bulgaria Australia India
Belgium* Czech Rep Canada Israel
Finland* Estonia* Denmark* Japan
France* Hungary Greece* Korea
Italy* Latvia Norway Malaysia
Ireland* Lithuania New Sealand Mexico
Luxemburg* Poland Sweden* Philippines
Netherlands* Romania Switserland* Singapore
Portugal* Slovak Rep. UK Thailand
Spain* Slovenia US Turkey
* Fixed or Managed Regimes vis-a-vis Germany
occur in tandem. Formally, relative PPP holds if
p˜ = s+ κ+ ν, (4)
where ν is a zero mean disturbance term. Substitution into (3) and rearranging
renders the monetarist model of the flexible exchange rate
s = βm˜+ λr˜ − τ y˜ − η˜, (5)
where η˜ ≡ κ + ν + ε˜. The model predicts that the forex is related to three
fundamental economic factors, respectively the relative money supply m˜, the
interest rate differential r˜, and the output differential y˜.
In the next sub-section the monetary forex rate model (5) is employed to
analyze the relations between the mean and variance of the forex rate changes
with the means and variances of the relative changes in the other variables.
However, before we can go into this analysis, we first need to estimate the co-
efficients of model (5). The nonstationarity of the variables permits estimation
in levels, but in order to obtain standard errors, we employ the dynamic OLS
technique. The coefficients are restricted to be identical across countries. The
theoretical reason for this restriction is that the structural model is not country-
specific. Another reason is that per country time series estimates usually fail to
deliver meaningful results, since countries do not often change their monetary
regimes. But across countries, monetary regimes do differ substantially, and
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Table 2: Panel Dynamic OLS Regressions
c β λ τ AEG
ALL 0.006 0.860 -1.433 -0.901 -0.242
( 871 observations) ( 0.020) ( 0.035) ( 1.045) ( 0.141) ( 0.088)
( 0.304) ( 24.760) (-1.371) (-6.372) (-2.761)
WEST + REST 0.055 0.762 1.724 -0.595 -0.432
( 437 observations) ( 0.018) ( 0.023) ( 0.459) ( 0.089) ( 0.081)
( 3.051) ( 33.048) ( 3.758) (-6.714) (-5.354)
CEEC -0.030 0.981 -1.649 -1.662 -0.219
( 219 observations) ( 0.087) ( 0.041) ( 1.269) ( 0.343) ( 0.094)
(-0.346) ( 23.982) (-1.299) (-4.842) (-2.339)
EMU 0.048 -0.121 3.079 -0.016 -0.316
( 215 observations) ( 0.010) ( 0.025) ( 0.448) ( 0.041) ( 0.095)
( 5.073) (-4.758) ( 6.865) (-0.385) (-3.324)
ALL without Bulgaria 0.033 0.702 1.514 -0.413 -0.194
( 850 observations) ( 0.014) ( 0.036) ( 0.439) ( 0.099) ( 0.050)
( 2.376) ( 19.500) ( 3.452) (-4.160) (-3.884)
CEEC without Bulgaria 0.003 0.883 2.971 -0.555 -0.171
( 198 observations) ( 0.062) ( 0.047) ( 0.889) ( 0.215) ( 0.077)
( 0.042) ( 18.687) ( 3.342) (-2.576) (-2.213)
Numeraire: Germany; Period: 1994:II 1999:III; Cointegration model (13);
Pooled cointegration test (14); In parenthesis: Standard errors (first row) and
t-statistics (second row).
hence yield valuable information. A panel with cross country coefficient restric-
tions can exploit this variation to obtain meaningful parameter estimates. The
cross-section coefficient restriction is moreover instrumental for the empirical
analysis, given the limited amount of data available for the CEECs. The time
series dimension of our CEEC panel data is in fact extremely limited. For the
10 CEECs in our panel we have at most 6 annual observations that are driven
by market forces rather than central planning. For this reason we increase the
panel’s cross-section by adding 30 other countries and increase the time-series
dimension by using quarterly observations instead of annual observations. The
data set is described in detail in Appendix A.1.
Since we are primarily interested in the behavior of CEECs vis-a-vis EMU,
we choose Germany as the numeraire country. To examine the robustness of
the estimation results, we repeat the regression for various country groupings.
The panel is subdivided into three groups: CEEC, EMU, and WEST+REST.
Clearly, CEEC contains the potential Central and Eastern European entrants,
while EMU comprises all countries in the European Economic and Monetary
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Union (with exception of the numeraire Germany). The groupingWEST+REST
contains industrialized countries which are not in the EMU. The exact compo-
sition of the groupings is given by table 1. Since Bulgaria went through an
abysmal monetary crisis during the years 1996-97, we also repeat the regression
for panels without that country.2 The long-run coefficient estimates are re-
ported in table 2. In addition to these estimates of the panel dynamic OLS, we
include the pooled Augmented Engle-Granger (AEG) cointegration test statis-
tic in the last column of table 2. To stay focussed on economic issues, we choose
to present only the directly relevant empirical results. A discussion on estima-
tion techniques, such as the AEG cointegration tests, and intermediate steps is
relegated to the Appendix A.2.
The monetary homogeneity hypothesis β = 1 holds up quite well in the
different panels, except when the data are restricted to the EMU countries.
But this is not so surprising, since convergence between these countries in the
1994-1999 period in anticipation of the monetary unification gives insufficient
variation in the money data to get a reliable estimate. Per contrast, the mon-
etary hyper expansion in Bulgaria during the years 1996-97 is very conducive
for producing a reliable estimate of β. When Bulgaria’s data is included, the
relative money shocks of the CEECs appear to be completely absorbed by the
forex rate, see third row table 2. However, when Bulgaria is dropped from the
CEEC group, the money effect is less pronounced, see last row of table 2. One
also finds that when the interest data from Bulgaria is included the interest
semi-elasticity λ turns negative, but insignificantly so. The estimation results
are thus seriously affected by the interest rate hike that took place in Bulgaria
during the 1996-97 hyper inflation period.3 There is furthermore quite some
variation in the income elasticity τ , but the estimates are always negative, and
mostly significantly so.
An important issue is whether the estimates of coefficients β, λ, and τ are
structural, in the sense of Lucas (1976). Coefficients are probably not structural
when panel cointegration is rejected. The last column in table 2 gives the
pooled Augmented Engle-Granger (AEG) test statistic for cointegration. Under
certain conditions, the asymptotic critical t-value equals −3.74 at the 5% level.4
So, convincing evidence for cointegration is found only in case of the WEST
and REST grouping. The WEST+REST group estimates appear robust to
2For a description of Bulgaria’s recent monetary history we refer to the IMF policy discus-
sion paper by Gulde (1999).
3The Bulgarian lending rate (IFS code 91860P..ZF) in the second quarter of 1996 was
around 50% per annum. Then it started to increase rapidly. At the top, in the first quarter
of 1997, the rate was close to 230%. During 1997 the interest rates fell rapidly to about 13%.
4See Appendix section A.2.
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Lucas’ policy critique. These estimates are theoretically consistent, and pooled
cointegration can not be rejected. By contrast, the pooled cointegration tests
for the CEEC and EMU group point to strong transition effects. The countries
in these groups have clearly not converged to the long run stationary state.
2.2 Characterization of Monetary Policy Regimes
In order to characterize empirically the different monetary policy regimes and
the trade-offs represented by the different regimes, we assume that each country
in the sample has essentially operated one particular regime. This gives ”one
observation” of the per country variables, and the cross-section provides the
overview of alternative regimes. To capture the regime specifics, we estimate
per-country the empirical moments of the monetary models’ variables. Sub-
sequently, we perform a cross-country rank regression analysis on the sample
moments in order to assess how the characteristics of the domestic policy regime
are related to the specifics of the forex regime in place, and vice versa. From a
policy maker view point, probably the most relevant empirical question to be
answered is which type of monetary regime has been associated with the most
favorable output growth characteristics.
By defining composite financial variable f ≡ βm˜ + λr˜ and real variable
g ≡ −τ y˜, model (5) may be written compactly as s = f + g + η˜. Accordingly,
the forex return obeys
∆s = ∆f +∆g +∆η˜, (6)
where ∆ is the first-difference operator. For a proper interpretation of equation
(6), note that, ∆g and ∆y˜ enter the model with opposite signs. Consequently,
a country grows faster than Germany if ∆g < 0 so that −τ∆y˜ > 0. Model (6)
imposes a structure on the moments of the forex return process. Let country
i’s moments be defined as µx,i ≡ E {∆xi,t}, σ2x,i ≡ V ar {∆xi,t} , and σxu,i ≡
Cov {∆xi,t,∆ui,t} , so that the moment decompositions can be expressed as
µs,i = µf,i + µg,i + Ei (7a)
σ2s,i = σ
2
f,i + σ
2
g,i + 2σfg,i + Ui. (7b)
Since the monetary forex rate model (6) contains an unobserved residual ∆η˜,
the moment decompositions (7) contain the unidentified components Ei and Ui.
In the empirical analysis, Ei and Ui are just residuals.
As explained above, we propose to perform a cross-country rank regression
analysis on the empirical moments in order to asses the links across regime
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specifics. Our empirical analysis therefore consists of two steps. In the first
step we estimate the empirical first and second moments of the models’ compo-
nents country by country. Specifically, given the panel coefficient estimates β̂,
τ̂ , and λ̂, and the historical panel data on si,t, m˜i,t, r˜i,t, and y˜i,t, we construct
for each country, i = 1, ..., N , the composite financial variable fi,t ≡ β̂m˜i,t+λ̂r˜i,t
and a real variable gi,t ≡ −τ̂ y˜i,t, and estimate the moments (7). In line with
our arguments in the previous sub-section, the long-run coefficient estimates
are those from the WEST+REST panel estimation. In addition, we calculate
the fundamentals’ sample correlation coefficient ρfg,i = σfg,iσ−1f,i σ
−1
g,i . To in-
terpret ρfg,i correctly, recall that we defined ∆gi,t = −τ∆y˜i,t. Thus positive
linear dependence between ∆fi,t and ∆gi,t implies negative correlation between
∆fi,t and ∆y˜i,t. As the number of countries is large, it is impracticable to
report all empirical moments. We decided to summarize the results of the per-
country tests by reporting the cross-sectional mean and standard deviation of
each component for the various country groupings in Table 3.
There are pronounced differences between the various regions. In general,
growth rates and the variances of all economic variables are remarkably low in
the EMU group, while they are substantial in the CEEC group (including and
excluding Bulgaria). In general the WEST+REST group has a middle position,
except that the WEST+REST forex volatility is substantially higher than in
the CEEC excluding Bulgaria. This indicates that CEECs try to stabilize the
value of their currencies vis-a-vis Germany. There are noteworthy differences in
sample correlations between financial and real growth rates, see table 3 last row.
While the ∆fi,t and ∆yi,t are on average negatively correlated within EMU, they
are on average positively correlated within CEEC. The negative correlation
within EMU countries is obviously due to the monetary unification process and
the anticipated entry to EMU. On the other hand, the positive correlation in the
CEECs points at a lack of monetary prudence. As the numbers in parenthesis
show, the cross-sectional standard deviations of the monetary components are
very low in the EMU group, while they are extremely high in the CEEC group
including Bulgaria. This finding is important for cross-sectional analysis of
policy regimes. High cross-sectional variation is very conducive for producing a
reliable characterization of policy regimes. Per contrast, cross-sectional analysis
is useless when sample moments tend to cluster together, since then one gets
just only ”one observation” for the whole cross-section. For this reason we
decided to exclude the EMU countries from the cross-section analysis.
In the second step of our analysis, we examine the linkages across the mo-
ment estimates of the first step. Specifically, in order to disentangle the cross-
9
Table 3: Cross-Sectional Averages
ALL WEST CEEC EMU ALL CEEC
+REST - Bulgaria - Bulgaria
µs 1.18 0.80 3.24 -0.11 0.80 1.83
(3.84) (3.39) (5.72) (0.23) (3.04) (3.79)
µf 1.83 1.69 3.60 0.33 1.64 3.01
(2.81) (2.89) (3.08) (1.01) (2.59) (2.59)
µg -0.25 -0.28 -0.08 -0.37 -0.28 -0.19
(0.45) (0.36) (0.54) (0.50) (0.41) (0.43)
E -0.40 -0.62 -0.29 -0.07 -0.56 -0.99
(1.48) (0.80) (2.73) (0.71) (1.06) (1.65)
σ2s 56.49 53.01 116.27 3.64 33.92 25.14
(150.36) (55.49) (290.41) (4.89) (47.99) (38.12)
σ2f 16.53 9.22 42.87 4.79 8.43 10.70
(53.35) (19.68) (102.07) (7.43) (15.13) (8.99)
σ2g 3.84 2.61 7.61 2.55 3.13 4.94
(5.24) (2.48) (8.88) (2.46) (2.71) (2.94)
σfg 3.75 1.30 12.10 0.31 0.35 -1.72
(22.12) (6.88) (43.76) (1.28) (5.17) (2.40)
U 32.36 39.88 53.70 -4.01 22.02 11.22
(78.93) (52.72) (137.60) (9.70) (44.69) (31.70)
ρfg 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.01 -0.08
(0.25) (0.26) (0.30) (0.15) (0.23) (0.19)
Numeraire: Germany; Period: 1994:III-1999:III; Moment Decompositions (7);
Cross-Sectional standard deviations in parenthesis.
moment linkages we perform a multiple regression analysis for the rank ordered
moment estimates. The reason for using rank-ordered instead of raw moments
is that there are quite some outliers in the data, as we have seen before. For
instance, the Bulgarian time series contain quite some extreme observations. In
such circumstances the regular correlation coefficient is likely to be fragile, see
Levine and Renelt (1992). To underpin our choice of rank association measure,
we present in figure 1 the cross-country scatter plots for raw and rank-ordered
fundamental average values µf,i, and µg,i vis-a-vis the mean forex return µs,i.
At the top of each of the scatter plots we report the respective correlation es-
timate. These sample correlations are based on a cross-section of 30 countries.
(The EMU data is excluded as noted before.) It can be seen that the choice of
the metric underlying the association measure is of major importance for the
10
Figure 1: Scatter Plot Averages
Left-hand side: point estimates;
Right-hand side: ranks of point estimates as % of total.
Panel I: µs versus µf
0 5 10 15
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
bg
cz
es
hg
la
li
pl
rm
sk
sn
au
ca
dk
gr
no
ns
se
swukus
in
is
jp
ko
ma
mx
ph
sg th
tk
µ
s
µf
correlation = 0.9382
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
bg
cz
es
hg
la
li
pl
rm
sk
sn
au
ca
dk
gr
no
ns
se
sw
uk
us
in
is
jp
ko
ma
mx
ph
sg
th
tk
correlation = 0.7833
µ
s
µf
Panel II: µs versus −µg
0 5 10 15
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
bg
cz
es
hg
la
li
pl
rm
sk
snau
cadk
grno
ns
se
sw
uk
us
in
is
jp
ko
ma
mx
phsg
th
tk
µ
s
µg
correlation = −0.4629
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
bg
cz
es
hg
la
li
pl
rm
sk
sn
au
ca
dk
grno
ns
se
sw
uk
us
in
is
jp
ko
ma
mx
ph
sg
th
tk
correlation = 0.08031
µ
s
µg
Numeraire: Germany; Period: 1994:III-1999:III;
outcomes. For example, take a look at the top panels in figure 1. The sample
correlation coefficient for the pair [µs,i, µf,i] is seen to be a substantial 0.94. But
after a look at the scatter plot one must conclude that this association estimate
is driven by a few outliers. Per contrast, when the data is rank-ordered first (see
right top panel), the rank correlation estimate is lower, namely 0.78. In this
case the scatter plot does not reveal an important ’Bulgaria effect’. Compared
to the rank correlation, the regular correlation overestimates the association
between µs,i and µf,i considerably. Even worse, from the lower panels in figure
1 it can be seen that just a few outliers may cause the correlation to switch
its sign. Overall, the rank correlation appears to deliver the more robust re-
sults, and for this reason we use rank-ordered instead of raw moments in the
cross-section analysis.
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Table 4: Multiple Rank Regressions Across Moments
µs µf µg σ
2
s σ
2
f σ
2
g
µs — 0.57 -0.03 0.29 -0.08 -0.09
— (0.09) (0.28) (0.20) (0.17) (0.20)
µf 0.85 — -0.14 -0.17 0.39 0.41
(0.19) — (0.28) (0.25) (0.21) (0.25)
µg -0.02 -0.04 — -0.01 0.35 -0.24
(0.13) (0.09) — (0.23) (0.12) (0.11)
σ2s 0.16 -0.06 -0.01 — 0.01 0.12
(0.14) (0.08) (0.26) — (0.16) (0.17)
σ2f -0.07 0.23 0.63 0.01 — 0.47
(0.16) (0.10) (0.20) (0.25) — (0.18)
σ2g -0.07 0.23 -0.42 0.19 0.46 —
(0.16) (0.12) (0.12) (0.25) (0.19) —
Dfix 2.58 -3.68 0.12 -11.04 0.93 2.88
(3.51) (3.37) (3.29) (2.28) (3.76) (3.10)
intercept 1.85 1.79 14.91 12.43 -2.08 4.46
(3.27) (2.74) (5.85) (4.73) (2.77) (3.92)
Numeraire: Germany; Period: 1994:III-1999:III; Cross-Section: CEEC and
WEST&REST; Multiple rank regression model (15); Standard errors in paren-
thesis. Bold faced values are significant at 5% level.
As explained above, we perform a multiple regression analysis for the rank
ordered moment estimates in order to disentangle the cross-sectional variation
in regime specifics. The dependent variable is the rank of an average value or
variance. The rank regression results are reported in table 4. For example,
in the first column of table 4 we report the results for the regression of the
rank-ordered average forex return µs,i on an intercept, a regime dummy (Dfixi ),
the rank-ordered mean values of the fundamentals (µf,i and µg,i), and the rank-
ordered volatilities (σ2s,i, σ
2
f,i, and σ
2
g,i). We add the rigid forex regime dummy
in order to measure a level effect of this regime. In table 1 we indicate to which
countries a rigid regime has been assigned. All these countries had a fixed, or
nearly fixed foreign rate regime vis-a-vis Germany at the beginning of the data
sample, December 1993. We note that a flexible regime was assigned to Bulgaria
because this country introduced the currency board vis-a-vis the euro not at
the beginning but during the sample period, namely in 1997.5 Furthermore, we
5See for instance Gulde (1999).
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assigned flexible regimes to Lithuania and Latvia since these Baltic countries
are not on a currency board vis-a-vis the euro, but instead vis-a-vis the dollar
and SDE, respectively.6 We add the volatilities to the mean regressions in
order to control for the premia associated with these risk factors. Similarly,
the variance regressions are augmented with mean values in order to control
for possible feedback from the premia to the risk factors. For more technical
details see the Appendix A.3.
The partial effects between nominal mean values, µs,i and µf,i, are still sub-
stantial in the multiple regressions, namely 0.85 and 0.57, see the first and sec-
ond column in table 4. These highly significant values indicates that countries
with low (high) average financial growth tended to experience small (sizeable)
depreciations, and the other way around. The regression for µf,i also show that
there are (weakly significant) positive mean-variance effects in the financial pro-
cess. Countries with unstable markets were more likely to have high financial
growth rates than countries with stable markets.
Interestingly, the slope coefficients on the financial and real volatilities have
opposite signs, and significantly so, see third column table 4. This suggests
that real growth rates are determined by a trade-off between financial and real
stability. The highest real growth rates are observed in financial stable countries
(low σ2f ) where output increased along an unstable path (high σ
2
g). On the other
hand, the lowest real growth rates are observed in financial unstable countries
(low σ2f ) where output fell along a deterministic trend (high σ
2
g). To sum up, it
appears that financial certainty together with some flexibility in the production
has been most advantageous for economic growth.
It is also of interest to examine partial volatility effects in the growth regres-
sion. Given real volatility, countries were more likely to have high (low) relative
output growth if they had low (high) financial variability. Notice that the con-
verse is also the case, in the sense that high-growth countries were more likely
to have stable financial markets than low-growth countries, see the fifth column
in table 4. Given the financial volatility, high-output-volatility countries were
more likely to have higher relative output growth then low-output-volatility and
vice versa (see last column table 4). What is also of interest is that there is a
significant positive interrelationship between both fundamental volatilities. In
particular, we obtained significantly positive estimates for the coefficient on σ2g
in the regression for σ2f , as well as for the coefficient on σ
2
f in the regression
for σ2g , see last two columns table 4. This suggests that countries with the
more (un)stable output market had a greater probability of having (un)stable
6See Rudgalvis (1996), and Viksnins (2000).
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financial trends and vice versa.
The adoption of a currency peg has a significant negative level effect on
the forex volatility, see fourth column table 4. Thus, as must be true almost
by definition, we find that countries with rigid forex regimes tended to have
lower forex volatility. Somewhat puzzling, and contrary to simple intuition,
is that in the regression for σ2g the coefficients on the fundamental volatilities
(σ2f and σ
2
g) are insignificant. This indicates that fundamental uncertainty did
not help explaining the forex uncertainty over and above the rigid forex regime
level effect. It is of interest to note that bivariate sample (rank) correlations
between fundamental volatilities and forex volatility are significantly positive
(estimation results on request). To sum up, fundamental risks do matter for
forex uncertainty if evaluated in isolation, but when information about the forex
regime is taken into account these effects disappears.
Probably the most striking result of our empirical study is the flip side of
the above result. Influences of the exchange rate variables on the real growth
rate are apparently absent. The rigid regime dummy (Dfixi ), the average forex
return (µs), as well as the forex volatility (σ2s) do not contribute significantly
to the explanation of the variation in the averages and variances of real growth
rate (µg and σ2g) across countries, see table 4 last two columns. This result
is crucially important in light of our policy discussion. It supports the view
that growth and fluctuations in the real sector are to a first-order unrelated
to the adoption of a rigid exchange rate regime. Since we also find that high
financial variability went hand-in-hand with low average growth, we conclude
that economic growth is best served by providing domestic financial stability.
Some recent studies provide weak evidence that the choice of forex regime
matters for the behavior of macro-economic fundamentals, but results are mixed,
however, in the sense that there is no agreement on the regime-specific effects.7
In our view, the weakness and inconsistency of these empirical studies does sup-
port our claim that choice of the exchange rate regime is of lesser importance;
what matters is the institutional structure within which domestic monetary and
fiscal policies are formulated.
In order to assess whether or not our rank regression results are sensitive to
the definition of the dependent nominal variable, we decide to repeat our anal-
ysis for the international price differential.8 If the rank regression coefficients
change drastically when the nominal forex s is replaced by the international
7Important contributions to the empirical literature on currency regimes include Ghosh,
Gulde, Ostry and Wolf (1997), and Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (1998) and Edwards (1996,98).
8In order to save space, these results are not reported here, but they will be made available
on our web page in the near future.
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price differential p˜, this would be unfavorable to our results. Overall, we find
quite similar results as in table 4, which suggest that our rank regression is
indeed robust to the definition of the endogenous nominal variable. For in-
stance, just like the forex rate, the relative inflation rate has been insulated
from domestic economic growth. It is further worthwhile mentioning that in
the inflation rank regression analysis we find a significant negative link between
the average fundamental values. It appears that economic growth goes hand in
hand with financial expansion.
2.3 The Forward Looking Model
We found above evidence for the proposition that growth is to a first-order
unrelated to the choice of forex regime. What does theory have to say on
this matter? Consider the monetary model of the exchange rate (5) with time
indices, but without residual
st = m˜t − τ y˜t + λr˜t. (8)
Suppose furthermore, that uncovered interest parity holds
r˜t = Et {st+1 − st} , (9)
where Et {st+1} is the time t expected exchange rate for time t+1. Substitution
into (8) and rearranging gives
st =
1
(1 + λ)
(m˜t − τ y˜t) + λ(1 + λ)Et {st+1} .
Solving forward, we arrive at9
st =
1
(1 + λ)
∞∑
i=0
Et {m˜t+i − τ y˜t+i}
(1 + 1/λ)i
. (10)
The stability of {st} has to be achieved by stabilizing the expectations regard-
ing the fundamental process {m˜t+i − τ y˜t+i}. In summary, the folk theorem of
exchange rate economics maintains:
Theorem 1 The current exchange rate is determined by the discounted sum of
all future expected fundamentals.
9We do not necessarily rule out the bubble solution (see below). It be noted, though, that
empirical evidence has not generated much evidence for the bubble solutions.
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What does the theorem imply for the relation between the variability of
the forex return process {∆st} and the fundamental growth process {∆m˜t+i −
τ y˜∆t+i}? Suppose that the composite fundamental, zt = m˜t − τ y˜t, follows a
driftless random walk
zt+1 = zt + σξξt+1, (11)
where{ξt+1} is assumed to be a white noise process. In that case Et {∆zt+i} =
σξEt {ξt+1} = 0 for all i. Under this condition the forward solution of the forex
rate (10) implies that ∆st = ∆zt. Consequently, the behavior of the composite
fundamental, zt, is transferred, one for one, to the exchange rate, st. It be
noted that the random walk model (11) is somewhat restrictive since it implies
that the interest differential is always zero r˜t = Et {∆st+1} = 0 which is clearly
counterfactual. Nevertheless, it also part of the folk wisdom on exchange rate
economics that {st} approximately follows a random walk. Anyway, the result
below does not depend critically on the random walk assumption; see next
sub-section
Corollary 1 Under the assumption that the composite fundamental process
{zt} follows a random walk with white noise innovation process {ξt}, the volatil-
ity of the composite fundamental is transferred, one for one, to the exchange
rate σ2z = σ
2
ξ = σ
2
s . But it does not follow from Theorem 1 that, in a multiple
(rank) regression, the variability of exchange rate, σ2s , depends significantly on
the fundamental volatilities, σ2f and σ
2
g .
It may thus happen that σ2z itself is low (high), while each of the individual
fundamental variances, σ2f and σ
2
g , are high (low). One extreme possibility
is that output and money move in tandem, so that σ2z = 0 = σ
2
s . In fact,
this situation is exactly what the single monetary policy and the Growth and
Stability Pact is all about. This pact should ensure that correlation between
local financial and real economic variables increases. It is for these reasons that
output growth can be unrelated to the forex variable. Seen in this way, our
multiple rank regression results are consistent with the theory on forex rates.
Two important policy conclusions follow. First, due to the forward looking
nature of the forex market, exchange rate stability hinges on the stability of the
institutional structure within which monetary and fiscal policies are formulated.
More uncertainty in the money market translates into more uncertainty in the
forex market. Seen in this way, a flexible exchange rate can be very stable, if
the current and anticipated monetary and fiscal policies are coherent with the
current rate, as countries like Switzerland and The Netherlands have shown.
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Conversely, as is illustrated by the lively history of the EMS and other currency
arrangements, a managed float or fixed rate system can be very unstable.
Policy makers should also accept that the usefulness of a currency peg de-
pends on the quality of the institutional structure and the degree of business
cycle synchronization. Asymmetric and persistent real shocks render all markets
unstable, even under a currency peg. Due to institutional underdevelopment
capital is not invested efficiently, and the peg may come under attack. In the
presence of asymmetric shocks and inefficiencies, the forex remains a useful au-
tomatic stabilizer. For smaller economies asymmetric real shocks are probably
much less important because they are relatively open to trade.10
We end the section with two observations. First, it is well known that
the complete solution under rational expectations for st = (1 + 1/λ)tct, where
E[ct+1] = ct, also comprises a bubble part. But it is easily shown that this does
not affect the propositions qualitatively (not even if ct = zt).
Second, as we noted above, the random walk assumption has the counter-
factual implication that the interest differential is always zero. To break away
from this implication, suppose that a risk premium pit enters the uncovered
interest parity condition (9). In that case the interest differential obeys
r˜t = Et {st+1 − st + pit} .
Substitution into (8), and solving forward under the maintained assumption
that fundamentals follow a random walk, one arrives at
st = zt +
λ
1 + λ
∞∑
i=0
Et {pit+i}
(1 + 1/λ)i
.
This equation again describes how the current exchange rate depends on the
expected path of fundamentals and, in addition, on the expected future risk
premia. Since the risk premium process {pit+i} is generally a function of the
fundamental process {zt+i}, we can assume that the expected risk premium
Et {pit+i} is a function of the fundamentals zt. The qualitative results from
theorem 1 and corollary 1 again carry over.
10For a detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of exchange rate targeting,
see Williamson (1995), Ghosh et al. (1998), and Calvo and Reinhart (2000). The exchange
rate option of currency boards for CEECs is analyzed thoroughly by Rudgalvis (1996), and
Viksnins (2000) for the Baltic Republics, and Gulde (1999) for Bulgaria.
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3 EMU Entry of Accession Countries
In this section we analyze in detail the endogenous response to accession to
EMU.11 In order to draw a comparison between pre- and post-entry monetary
status, we first characterize the these two situations on basis of the standard
monetary theory. It turns out that EMU entry is likely to lead to a significant
reduction of the country-specific financial risk. Furthermore, due to the forward
looking nature of financial markets, the CEEC may bring forward the benefits
of EMU entry through a credible announcement of entry at some future date.
3.1 Endogenous Responses to Entry
The flexible forex model (5) is the starting point of our analysis of the endoge-
nous responses to entry. To stress the fact that entry is likely to lead to a
structural change of fundamental processes, we use throughout a superscript
’post’ to indicate the ex post processes.
When a country enters the monetary union at time t = t, its forex rate is
fixed at a level s. Consequently the noisy component νt in the PPP condition
(5) is restricted to equal zero
spostt = s = κ+ p˜
post
t , for t ≥ t. (12a)
Assuming that uncovered interest parity (9) holds, it follows also that the in-
terest differential is zero
r˜postt = Et
{
∆spostt+1
}
= Et {s− s} = 0, for t ≥ t. (12b)
Taken together, through monetary unification a country eliminates forex and
interest risk. Imposing restrictions (12) onto the forex rate model (5) shows
that the nominal forex return after monetary unification obeys the relationship
∆s = β∆m˜post − τ∆y˜post −∆ε˜post = 0.
Note also that due to the forex peg, the real forex return equals the international
inflation differential after entry. Formally, the real forex rate is defined as wt =
p˜t−st. After entry wpostt = p˜postt −s, so log growth rates obey ∆wpostt = ∆p˜postt .
As before, in order to characterize the monetary policy regime, we calculate
11Arnold and de Vries (2000a,b) used a similar argument but in a different context, they
investigate the implications of EMU for the first wave of entries into EMU.
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the forex return’s moment decompositions
0 = βµpostm − τµposty + Epost
0 = β2σ2postm + τ
2σ2posty + βτσ
post
my + Upost.
Other things equal, the post-accession financial growth rates are likely to be
much smaller and more stable than their pre-entry counterparts (7). The rea-
son is that participation in the EMU eliminates the noise component ν and
the interest differential ∆r˜. Besides this direct effect, monetary unification is
also likely to trigger indirect endogenous responses in financial and real sec-
tors. First, it is likely to lead to a reduction of country-specific financial risk.
Participating countries in the EMU showed a higher convergence of monetary
policy variables than nonparticipating countries.12 This nominal risk reduction
is likely to be conducive for output growth. Secondly, in the longer run it is
most probable that EMU entry will lead to a structural fall of the relative pro-
duction volatility. Due the single monetary policy and the Growth and Stability
Pact, the EMU countries showed a stronger business cycle synchronization than
nonparticipating countries.13
3.2 Entry Announcement
According to the forward solution of the monetary model an entry announce-
ment not only forces a prediction on the current behavior of the forex variable,
but also on the speed of convergence of policy variables. We illustrate this by
considering the hypothetical situation in which an accession country is allowed
to enter EMU after 2 years at the exchange rate s.
The forex rate before the entry announcement obeys the forward solution
of the monetary model (10) truncated at time t+ 2, i.e.
st =
1
(1 + λ)
Et {zt}+ λ
(1 + λ)2
Et {zt+1}+ λ
2
(1 + λ)2
Et {st+2} .
At time t it is announced that after 2 years the exchange rate is fixed at s. When
this announcement is credible, the expectations converge to the announced rate
Et {st+2} = s, and as a consequence the forex rate after the entry announcement
12See e.g., Brada and Kutan (2001). They find ”significant long- and short-run linkages
between German base money stock and that of the most recent members of the EU; the same
holds true for the non-transition economies”. By contrast, the monetary bases of the CEECs
appear only weakly linked to that of Germany, or even unrelated.
13See e.g., Artis and Zhang (1995), and Fatas (1997). In fact, also in case of CEECs the
trade links and synchronization of business cycles with EU are already increasing, see Fidrmuc
(2001).
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obeys
spostt =
1
(1 + λ)
zt +
λ
(1 + λ)2
Et {zt+1}+ λ
2
(1 + λ)2
s.
We see that the announcement forces the current forex rate to jump to a new
path that is consistent with st+2 = s. But ipso facto, the model forces a
prediction on the current behavior of policy variables as well. The path {sfixt }
can only be achieved if the path of the policy variables is consistent with this
path. Since from time t+ 2 onward st = s, necessarily
st+2 = st+2 = ... = s =
1
(1 + λ)
∞∑
i=0
Et+2 {zt+2+i}
(1 + 1/λ)i
,
which constrains all future paths of zt+2+i. One option is to keep domestic and
foreign variable in tandem, which is exactly what the single monetary policy
and the Growth and Stability Pact is all about. When the announced parity
is not in line with the future fundamental drivers, sooner or later a speculative
attack takes place.
An important policy implication of the above result is that the consistent
future fundamental paths can only be realized for some particular set of funda-
mental growth rates, given the initial fundamental values. For this reason the
policy variables may converge fast! As the cases of Italy and Portugal showed,
the perspective of entry brings forward the benefits of eliminating the currency
risk premium from the domestic interest rate. It can thus be argued that an
entry announcement provides a free lunch in the sense of lowering the commit-
ment costs, since many alternative paths are closed off (and at the cost that
the fundamental variables have indeed to be set consistent with the announced
path). Seen in this way, the forward looking nature of the forex provides an
argument for fast EMU accession.
4 EMU Accession Criteria and Euroisation
The direct and indirect endogenous responses sketched in the previous sub-
sections provide a strong argument in favor of EMU accession. However, to
enter EMU the accession countries need to satisfy the EMU accession crite-
ria, or so-called ”Copenhagen Criteria”, which are put down in the Composite
Paper, see European Commission (1998). In this section we analyze the fea-
sibility of two of these criteria, namely the low inflation, and stable currency
criteria for entry into EMU. Roughly, these criteria state that during two years
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before accession, the forex should be stable and inflation should be equal (or
lower) than the aggregate EMU inflation rate. We conclude that it is very diffi-
cult for the accession countries to simultaneously satisfy the low inflation, and
stable currency criteria. Fortunately, there is a possible escape route through
euroisation.
4.1 Feasibility of EMU Accession Criteria
CEECs are very likely to experience higher domestic inflation than current
EMU members due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Standard international
economics theory predicts that the labor productivity in the service oriented
non-traded goods sector grows less rapidly (relative to the incumbent countries)
in comparison to the labor productivity catch up in the traded goods sector. If
wages are equalized across sectors, prices of the non-traded goods in CEECs will
be rising faster, and cause apparent inflation.14 When the Balassa-Samuelson
effect turns out to be weak, this is good news for local policy makers in CEECs
who aim to bring down local inflation rates to EMU levels. However, when
the Balassa-Samuelson effect is strong, the perspective of EMU entry is not
flourishing. Since high local inflation is not permitted within EMU, the CEECs
that want to enter EMU would have to contract output in order to countervail
the inflationary pressures from the catching-up effects.
Most empirical studies do find evidence for the Balassa-Samuelson effect,
see for example, Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (1999), or Sinn and Reutter
(2001). In light of our policy discussion, the results of Sinn and Reutter (2001)
are particularly interesting since they look at Balassa-Samuelson effects within
EMU, as well as within a hypothetical enlarged EMU. They find that Balassa-
Samuelson effects cause prices in Finland, Ireland, Spain, and the Netherlands
to rise faster than in Germany. Moreover, they predict that when the CEECs
enter in EMU the Balassa-Samuelson effects will become more pronounced,
leading to an even higher aggregate EMU inflation rate.
Our own rank regression results for the international inflation differential
(not presented here) also provide evidence for a Balassa-Samuelson effect in
terms of financial growth rates, not in terns of inflation rates. We find that there
is a significant negative relation between the fundamental growth rates µf and
µg if relative inflation is taken into account. This indicates that expansionary
(contractionary) monetary policy was related to high (low) economic growth
14See Balassa (1964), and Samuelson (1964,1994). A competing strategy to explain the
persistent high inflation is the relative factor endowments theory of Kravis and Lipsey (1988)
and Bhagwati (1984). Yet another competing theory is the Lindner-type hypothesis which
stresses the role of demand factors, see e.g. Bergstrand (1991).
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rates, and vice versa. Consequently, accession countries have a problem to give
a fully credible signal that their excessive financial growth is due to catch-up
effects in productivity, and are not due to lack of monetary prudence. If these
countries cannot give such a signal, they might have to reduce economic growth
to counter high financial growth rates.
Exchange rate targeting gives rise to persistent oscillations in the real in-
terest rate and the real exchange rate due to the ’Walters’ effect’.15 Walters’
critique of premature pegging attempts, is build on the main argument that
high-inflation countries are characterized by inappropriately low real interest
rates. Consequently, fixed forces rates induce foreign capital that fuels a local
investment bubble. In the longer run, financial markets will recognize the local
investment bubble, and try to retrieve their capital. To keep the foreign capital
within the borders, the local authorities must promise higher nominal interest
rates. If they opt not to use the interest instrument, they have to abandon
the currency peg. Premature attempts to fix exchange rates are especially dan-
gerous for institutionally underdeveloped countries, such as the CEECs. The
anticipation of a stable path for the exchange rate in the short run, invites
for speculative capital inflows. The risk is that without the necessary checks
and balances in capital markets due to institutional underdevelopment, capital
inflows may not be allocated efficiently. In the longer run the capital inflows
reverse themselves on the smallest doubt, thereby triggering a speculative at-
tack. To resist such attacks the CEEC may have to raise its interest rates to
delirious levels, otherwise it will have to abandon the currency peg. The inter-
est rate hike is detrimental to local investment and activity, which may trigger
a devaluation for this reason. Recall, for instance the Irish and British interest
rate hikes during the EMS crisis.
4.2 Euroisation; A Resolution?
In the previous subsection it was argued that, due to the Balassa-Samuelson ef-
fects, local inflation rates in CEECs are expected be above the EMU average for
quite some time. It was also noted that high-inflation countries which peg their
currencies to the euro are likely to undergo persistent oscillations in the real in-
terest rate and the real exchange rate, due to the Walters’ effect. Furthermore,
the stable currency criterion can give rise to detrimental self-fulfilling cycle of
delay. To sum up, EMU entry seems to be out of the question, at least in the
15Former advisor to UK prime minister Margaret Thatcher, Sir Alan Walters, opposed
the entry of UK to EMS by pointing out the risk of interest rate hikes, see Walters (1986).
Recently, Leitemo and Røisland (2000) developed a monetary model that incorporates the
”Walters’ effect”.
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short-run. In this subsection we propose a resolution, namely the exchange rate
option of euroisation.16
If a CEEC euro-ises completely, its currency risk premium will be gone. For-
mally, in the monetary forex model euroisation amounts to setting the nominal
forex equal to unity st = 0 for all t > t, where t is the date of euroisation. It
follows that we can apply the post-entry conditions (12) discussed in the previ-
ous subsection. The fixing of the forex eliminates the interest rate differential
and the forex risk: r˜postt = νt = 0, for t ≥ t. More restrictive than before,
euroisation implies a zero log forex rate, spostt = 0. The PPP supposition (5)
states that relative prices equal the wedge: p˜postt = κ. Accordingly, we evaluate
the post-euroisation situation on basis of the relative pricing relationship (3).
The post-euroisation relative pricing relationship reads
p˜postt = βm˜
post
t − τ y˜postt − ε˜postt .
If there is a Balassa-Samuelson effect, then the euro-ised CEECs’ aggregate
price level rises persistently relative to the EMU, E{p˜postt } > 0, at the same
time production will also rise relative to EMU, E{y˜postt } > 0. But then the
monetarist model predicts that E{m˜postt } = E{p˜postt } + τE{y˜postt } > 0. As a
consequence of the Balassa-Samuelson effect money demand will be high in the
CEECs as compared to EMU area. Through complete euroisation the CEEC
can give a fully credible signal that its ’high inflation’ and, especially its ’ex-
cessive money growth’ is the result of inter-sectorial productivity asymmetries,
and not due to lack of monetary prudence.
5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
This paper claims that the choice of forex regime is not of first order importance
for economic growth. This claim was founded on empirical evidence that forex
returns does not help explain economic growth, nor does a fixed regime dummy.
A priori, the canonical forex model allows for both possibilities. The model
certainly does not imply that the choice of regime is important for growth
as we found empirically. The result that economic growth is insulated from
the exchange rate variable carries a very positive message for policy makers
supporting the view that the choice of forex regime is irrelevant. Policy can
focus on providing monetary stability, since it is monetary stability that is
16Euroisation is the Europe’s counterpart to dollarisation in the Americas. The exchange
rate option of euroisation for CEECs is examined in detail by Nuti (2000), and Schoors (2001),
amongst others. Dollarization is analyzed thoroughly by LeBaron and McCulloch (2000).
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conducive to growth.
It is showed next that standard monetary theory predicts that country spe-
cific financial risk will reduce significantly upon entry in EMU. Furthermore,
due to the forward looking nature of the forex, a credible entry announcement
does not only have implications for the future forex rate behavior, but it also
restricts the future behavior of fundamental drivers. At the same time, the
forward looking nature brings forward the benefits of eventual entry.
The paper also argues that the EMU accession criteria for low inflation and
stable currency are too rigid. Especially when the Balassa-Samuelson effect
is strong, the perspective of EMU entry is not prosperous. Since high local
inflation is not permitted, the CEECs would have to contract output in order
to countervail the inflationary pressures originating from the catching-up effects
To avoid the latter undesirable scenario, the incumbent EMU members must be
prepared to accept multiple Irelands for a number of years. Perhaps the EMU’s
Harmonized Consumer Price Index should be calculated only on the basis of
the price levels in the present EMU member countries for some time after the
entry of the CEEC.
The final conclusion is a subscription to an unconventional recipe. We argue
that by a full scale euroisation upon receipt of entry (commitment) from the
EU, the smaller countries could cross-out any remaining exchange rate and
interest rate uncertainty. At the same time such an arrangement would make
clear that the remaining inflationary pressures are entirely due to real factors,
such as the Balassa-Samuelson effect, and cannot be the result of imprudent
monetary policy on the side of CEECs.
References
Arnold, I.J.M and C.G. de Vries, “Endogeneity in European money demand,” European
Journal of Political Economy, 2000a.
Arnold, I.J.M. and C.G. de Vries, “Endogenous financial structure and the transmission
of ECB policy,” in J. Von Hagen and C. Waller, eds., Regional Aspects of Monetary
Policy in Europe, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000b, pp. 193–220.
Artis, M.J. and W. Zhang, “International business cycles and the ERM: Is there a
European business cycle?,” CEPR discussion paper, 1995, 1191.
Bacchetta, P. and E. van Wincoop, “Does exchange-rate stability increase trade and
welfare?,” American Economic Review, 2000, 90, 1093–1109.
Balassa, B., “The purchasing power parity doctrine: A reappraisal,” Journal of Political
Economy, 1964, 72, 584–596.
Bergstrand, J.H., “Structural determinants of real exchange rates and natural price
levels: Some empirical evidence,” American Economic Review, 1991, 81, 325–334.
24
Bhagwati, J.N., “Why are services cheaper in poor countries?,” Economic Journal,
1984, 94, 279–286.
Brada, J.C. and A.M. Kutan, “The convergence of monetary policy between candidate
countries and the European Union,” ZEI Policy Paper, 2001, B07-2001. Available
at: http://www.zei.de/download/zei_wp/B01-07.pdf.
Calvo, G.A. and C.M. Reinhart, “Fixing for your life,” NBER Working Paper, 2000,
8006. Available at: http://papers.nber.org/papers/W8006.pdf.
Canzoneri, M.B., R.E. Cumby, and B. Diba, “Relative labor productivity and the real
exchange rate in the long run: evidence for a panel of OECD countries,” Journal
of International Economics, 1999, 47, 245–266.
Davidson, R. and J.G. MacKinnon, Estimation and inference in econometrics, New
York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Edwards, S., “The Determinants of the Choice Between Fixed and Flexible
Exchange-Rate Regimes,” NBER Working Paper, 1996, 5756. Available at:
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w5756.pdf.
, “Exchange Rate Anchors and Inflation: A Political Economy Approach.,” in
S Eijffinger and H. Huizinga, eds., Positive Political Economy: Theory and Evi-
dence, Cambridge University Press Cambridge, UK 1998, pp. 187–212.
European Commission, “Composite Paper,” EC Brussels, 1998.
Fatas, A., “EMU: Countries or regions? Lessons from the EMS experience,” European
Economic Review, 1997, 41, 743–751.
Fidrmuc, J., “The endogeneity of the optimum currency area criteria, intraindustry
trade, and EMU enlargement,” LICOS Discussion Paper, 2001, 106.
Ghosh, A.R., A.M Gulde, and H.C. Wolf, “Currency boards: The ultimate fix?,”
International Monetary Fund Working Paper, 1998, 98/8. Available at:
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp9808.pdf.
, A.M. Gulde, J.D. Ostry, and H.C. Wolf, “Does the nominal exchange
rate regime matter?,” NBER Working Paper, 1997, 5874. Available at:
http://papers.nber.org/papers/W5874.pdf.
Gulde, A.M., “The role of the currency board in Bulgaria’s stabilization,” Inter-
national Monetary Fund Policy Discussion Paper, 1999, 99/3. Available at:
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/pdp/1999/pdp03.pdf.
Kravis, L.B. and R.E. Lipsey, “National price levels and the prices of tradables and
non-tradables,” American Economic Review, 1988, 78, 474–478.
LeBaron, B. and R. McCulloch, “Floating, fixed, or super-fixed? Dollarisation joins
the menu of exchange rate options,” American Economic Review, 2000, 90, 34–37.
Leitemo, K. and Ø. Røisland, “The choice of monetary policy regime for small
open economies,” Norges Bank’s Working Paper, 2000, 2000/5. Available at:
http://www.norges-bank.no/publikasjoner/arbeidsnotater.
Levine, R. and D. Renelt, “A sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth regressions,”
American Economic Review, 1992, 82, 942–963.
Lucas, Junior R.E., “Econometric policy evaluation: A critique,” Carnegie–Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy, 1976, 1, 59–46.
25
Nuti, D.M., “The costs and benefits of euro-isation in Central-
Eastern Europe before or instead of EMU membership,” William
Davidson Institute Working Paper, 2000, 340. Available at:
http://eres.bus.umich.edu/docs/workpap-dav/wp340.pdf.
Rudgalvis, K., “Establishing a new currency and exchange rate determination: The
case of Lithuania,” Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation Discussion
Paper, 1996, 96/4. Available at: http://www.hw.ac.uk/ecoWWW/cert/wpa/1996.
Samuelson, P.A., “Theoretical notes on trade problems,” Review of Economics and
Statistics, 1964, 46, 145–154.
Schoors, K., “The EU and its Eastern European accession countries; Should they adopt
the EURO before or after accession?,” Unpublished Manuscript, 2001.
Sinn, H.W. and M. Reutter, “The minimum inflation rate for Euroland,” NBER Work-
ing Paper, 2001, 8085. Available at: http://papers.nber.org/papers.
Stock, J.H. and M.W. Watson, “A simple estimator of cointegrating vectors in higher
order integrated systems,” Econometrica, 1995, 61, 783–820.
Viksnins, G.J., “Baltic monetary regimes in the XXIst century,” George-
town University Economics Discussion Paper, 2000, 00-02. Available at:
http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/viksning/papers.
Walters, A., Britain’s Economic Renaissance, Oxford University Press, 1986.
Williamson, J., “What role for currency boards?,” Policy Analyses In International
Economics, 1995, 40. Available at: http://www.iie.com/publications.
A Appendix
In the near future a more detailed appendix will be made available on line.
A.1 Panel Data Description
We analyze a panel data set containing quarterly monetary data for the CEECs,
the EMU, and other industrialized countries. Throughout the numeraire coun-
try is Germany. The panel covers 40 countries (excluding Germany) over the
period 1993:4 1999:3 (24 observations per country). The exact composition of
the country groupings is given by table 1. Our main data source is the Inter-
national Financial Statistics (IFS) data base. The following time series were
used. The forex rate S is the National Currency per US Dollar (lines AE and
AG IFS). When the forex series was provided in English denomination (lines
AG IFS), we inverted it to obtain the continental notation. Deutsche mark
exchange rates are derived using the triangle arbitrage rule. The output Y is
Industrial Production (lines 66 IFS), with exception of the CEECs. For Hun-
gary, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia the output is measured by GDP in historic
market prices. For the other CEECs the available output measure was GDP in
current market prices, which are deflated on basis of the consumer price index.
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The money stock M is Money plus Quasi-Money (lines 34 and 35 IFS), with
exception of some CEECs in which case the money series were downloaded from
the national bank. The Interest R is Lending Rate (lines 60P IFS). When the
lending rate series are unavailable or incomplete, we use the Deposit Rate (lines
60L IFS). Output and money are seasonally adjusted, and the data for s, m˜,
and y˜ are taken in deviation from their mean, to account for scale differences
between the country variables.
A.2 Panel Dynamic OLS Estimation
The coefficients of model (5) are estimated using the panel version of the Stock
and Watson’s dynamic OLS procedure.17 This panel dynamic OLS estimation
consists of a regression between the levels s, m˜, y˜, r˜, year dummies da,t (equal
to unity in year a), seasonal quarter dummies dq,t (equal to unity in quarter q),
as well as the one-period leads and lags:
si,t = c+ βm˜i,t + λr˜i,t − τ y˜i,t + da,t + dq,t
+ ai,1∆m˜i,t−1 + ai,2∆y˜i,t−1 + ai,3∆r˜i,t−1
+ ai,4∆m˜i,t+1 + ai,5∆y˜i,t+1 + ai,6∆r˜i,t+1 + ei,t, (13)
for i = 1, ..., N, t = 1, ..., T . Our main interest lies in the long-run coefficients
(β, τ , and λ). To save space we do not report the coefficients on the seasonal
dummies, nor the coefficients on the leads and lags.
To see whether the cointegrating vector applies to the panel, we run the
pooled Augmented Engle-Granger (AEG) test regression for panel residuals
∆ei,t = γei,s−1 + γ1∆ei,t−1 + γ2∆ei,t−2 + ui,t, (14)
for i = 1, ..., N, t = 1, ..., T . The null is a unit root H0 : ei,t ∼ I(1), which
corresponds to parameter restriction γ = 0. The choice of critical values is
determined by six factors, for which we assume the following: (i) The num-
ber of non-stationary variables on the RHS equals 3; (ii) The residual ei,t is
stationary; (iii) The number of countries N remains fixed forever; (iv) Time
T expands forever; (v) Non-stochastic regressors are excluded; and (vi) The
17It is well-known that the appropriate technique to estimate the foreign exchange rate
model (5) depends on the time series behavior of exchange rates, money, output, and interest
rates. Are these variables are individually integrated of order one and cointegrated?
Given that the time period available for estimation is short, the time series unit root tests
are doomed to fail; to test properly for a unit root one needs lots of observations, while we have
at most 24 quarterly observations per country. We did test for unit roots and cointegration
for each individual country. As expected, the null hypotheses of unit roots and cointegration
are rejected in most cases.
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residuals ei,t are perfectly correlated across countries. Notice that assumption
(vi) guarantees that the pooled test essentially collapses to a single time series
test. Under assumptions (i) to (vi), the appropriate asymptotic critical values
are those reported in table 20.2 in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). At the
5% level, MacKinnon’s critical value equals −3.74.
A.3 Multiple Rank Regressions
To perform the multiple rank regression, we stack the expected values and
variances into an (N × 6) matrix Q. Writing out this matrix explicitly
Q =

µs,1 µf,1 µg,1 σ
2
s,1 σ
2
f,1 σ
2
g,1
µs,2 µf,2 µg,2 σ
2
s,2 σ
2
f,2 σ
2
g,2
...
...
...
...
...
...
µs,N µf,N µg,N σ
2
s,N σ
2
f,N σ
2
g,N
 .
Let qi,m be a typical element of the matrix Q. Next, we construct an (N × 6)
rank-ordered matrix Qr with typical element qri,m that is equal to the ascending
rank order of the element qi,m in matrix Q. Thus if qi,m is the smallest value
in column m, then qri,m = 1; if qi,m is the second smallest value in column m
then qri,m = 2; etc. In order to measure a level effect of a rigid forex regime, we
construct a rigid regime dummy Dfixi which equals unity if country i has a rigid
forex regime, otherwise it equals zero.
The multiple rank regression involves an OLS regression of a specific column
in Qr on all other columns in Qr, a constant 1, and a regime dummy Dfixi , that
is
qri,m = a1+ bDfixi +
5∑
k
αm,kq
r
i,k + ²i,m, k 6= m (15)
for i = 1, ..., N.Here ²i,m is the residual. We test the null hypotheses that the
partial relations between columns m and k are absent, H0 : αm,k = 0, and that
there is no rigid regime level effect: H0 : b = 0.
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